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1. Propositional Logic
1.1 Truth-relevance
There are Boolean formulae such that their value can be determined by a 
subset of their variables. Consider for example A = P v ~P v Q. When v(P) is 
T then v(A) = T regardless of the value of Q. When v(P) = F then v(A) = T 
also regardless of the value Q. The set of variables occurring in A is {P, Q}. 
We say that the subset {P} is truth-determining for A; for all the valuations 
of {P}, i.e. v(P) = T and v(P) = F, we can determine the value of A regardless
of the other variables.
Definition 1.1.1: A set of propositional variables is truth-determining for a 
proposition A iff the value of A can be determined as true or false on all 
assignments of T, F to the set.
Another example: P → (Q → P) (1.1)
If P is true then (Q → P) is true regardless of the value of Q, but then the 
entire formula (1.1) is true (regardless of the value of Q.) Suppose P is false. 
Then (1.1) is true regardless of the value of Q.  In either case [i.e. v(P) = T 
or v(P) = F] the value of (1.1) can be determined without any knowledge of 
the value of Q. Thus {P} is truth-determining for (1.1). This is not the case 
for Q. For assume Q is true. Then the value of (Q → P) cannot be determined
without knowing the value of P. And without knowing the value of (Q → P), 
the value of (1.1) cannot be determined.
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Definition 1.1.2: Let Pi, ..., Pn be all the variables occurring in A. Then Pi is
truth-redundant (t-redundant) in A iff there is a truth determining set for A 
that does not contain Pi.
Definition 1.1.3: A is truth-relevant if it contains no truth-redundant 
variables.
These definitions are due to Diaz (1981,  pp. 65-67).
1.2 T-relevance with preconditions
Suppose we have a switching circuit with inputs P and Q and output 
equivalent to the Boolean expression ~P + Q. Suppose further that P is 
"stuck" in 0. [Such a fault can actually occur in electronic circuits.] Then the
output will always be 1 regardless of the value of Q. Therefore under the 
condition that P = 0, P is truth determining and Q is t-redundant. Note that 
if P is "stuck" in 1 then it is not truth determining. Also when P is 
permanently equal to 1, Q is not truth determining because it is not the case
that the output is solely determined by Q regardless of the value of P. 
Definition 1.2.1: Let A be a proposition such that certain propositional 
variables occurring in A can have only one truth value. A set of propositional
variables in such a proposition is truth-determining for a proposition A iff it 
is sufficient to determine the value of A.
The purpose of this concept will become apparent shortly.
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2. Predicate Logic with One Variable
2.1 Truth-relevance without predicate interpretation
Let us now consider a sentence of first order predicate logic:
(x)((Jx & ~Jx) → Sx) (2.1.1)
The Boolean table of  (Jx & ~Jx) → Sx looks as follows:
Row Jx Sx (Jx & ~Jx) (Jx & ~Jx) → Sx
1 0 0 0 1
2 0 1 0 1
3 1 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 1
Table 2.1.1
(We are using the symbols "0/1" as opposed to "F/T" as in our logic the 
Boolean values do not necessarily correspond to the truth values.)
We observe that for all assignments of the variable x to objects, the Boolean 
value of the expression (Jx & ~Jx) → Sx is 1, it is determined solely by Jx, 
and this is so because the value of (Jx & ~Jx) is always 0.
Definition 2.1.1: We will say that a predicate Fx is empty if ~(∃x)Fx and 
that it is universal if (x)Fx.
In the example above the predicate (Jx & ~Jx) is empty.
Definition 2.1.2: A set of one place atomic predicates for a monadic 
sentence A is truth-determining without predicate interpretation iff it is 
sufficient to determine the truth value of A without predicate interpretation.
Definition 2.1.3: A monadic sentence A is truth-relevant without predicate 
interpretation iff it does not have a proper subset of truth-determining 
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atomic predicates.
Our definition of satisfaction for monadic formulas will be identical with the 
classical definition.
Definition 2.1.4: A monadic sentence A is true without predicate 
interpretation if it is satisfied and t-relevant without predicate 
interpretation. A negation of a true sentence is false.
In the logic of presuppositions (Strawson, 1952, pp. 173-179) compatible 
with the semantics presented herein the sentence (2.1.1) is neither true nor 
false.
2.2 Truth-relevance with predicate Interpretation
By predicate interpretation U we will understand a universe of discourse i.e.
a set |U| of objects, plus the extent of all the predicates used in our 
language.
Let us consider the following predicate interpretation U:
|U| = the set of three children: Alex, Betty, Cindy; that is
|U| = {a, b, c}
Jx: x is John's child
~Ja, ~Jb, ~Jc
Sx: x is asleep
Sa, Sb, ~Sc
I.e. Alex and Betty are asleep and John has no children.
The Boolean table of  Jx → Sx looks as follows:
Row Jx Sx Jx→Sx
1 0 0 1
2 0 1 1
3 1 0 0
4 1 1 1
                                     Table 2.2.1
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We will now substitute constants corresponding to the elements of |U| one 
by one thus successively obtaining  Ja → Sa,  Jb → Sb,  Jc → Sc, the 
corresponding Boolean values being:
Jx Sx Jx→Sx Row of Table 1
Ja→Aa 0 1 1 2
Jb→Ab 0 1 1 2
Jc→Ac 0 0 1 1
                                                          Table 2.2.2
We observe that Jx is always 0, and subsequently the truth value of the 
implication is always 1 regardless of the value of Sx. Thus under predicate 
interpretation U,  Jx is truth determining and Sx is t-redundant. Note that 
Sx is not truth determining; it can be equal to 0 and then the outcome will 
depend on the value of Jx. The fact that John has no children is equivalent to
Jx being "stuck" at logical 0.
Let A(x) be a sentence with one variable. Then the following definitions 
apply.
Definition 2.2.1: A set of one place atomic predicates for a monadic 
sentence A is  truth-determining under predicate interpretation U iff it is 
sufficient to determine the truth value of A under predicate interpretation U.
Definition 2.2.2: A monadic sentence A is truth-relevant under predicate 
interpretation U iff it does not have a proper subset of truth-determining 
atomic predicates.
Our definition of satisfaction for monadic formulas will be identical with the 
classical definition.
Definition 2.2.3: A monadic sentence A is true under predicate 
interpretation U if it is satisfied and t-relevant under predicate 
interpretation U. A negation of a true sentence is false.
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Now consider:
(∃x)(Fx v Gx) (2.2.3)
It may not be immediately obvious what the conditions of t-relevance are. 
The sentence states that there is an x such that (Fx v Gx) and it is possible 
that ~Fx and it is possible that ~Gx. Should it happen that (x)Fx then Gx  
would not be relevant. Thus (∃x)~Fx and (∃x)~Gx are the presuppositions of 
(2.2.3), as well as of (x)(Fx v Gx). In the latter case (x)(Fx v Gx) == (x)~(~Fx
& ~Gx) == ~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx). This implies that it is possible that T(~Fx) 
and T(~Gx), i.e. that (∃x)~Fx and (∃x)~Gx.
We will summarize our findings in a table. The fifth column lists the 
relevance conditions.
Sentence Alternative Negation Alternative T-rel cond
~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx & Gx) ~(x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)Fx, (∃x)Gx
~(x)(Fx & Gx) (∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (x)(Fx & Gx) ~(∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)Fx, (∃x)Gx
~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)~Fx, (∃x)~Gx
~(x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx v Gx) (x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(∃x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)~Fx, (∃x)~Gx
Table 2.2.3
In the examples below the strings of symbols 'F', 'G', '*', '.' represent objects 
in a universe of discourse. Each string of symbols represents the entire 
universe of discourse. 'F' stands for an object in the extent of some 
predicate F(), 'G' stands for an object in the extent of some predicate G(), '*' 
stands for an object in the extent of both F() and G(), '.' stands for an object, 
which is neither in the extent of F() nor in the extent of G(). Thus e.g. in 
example 1 there are some objects in the extent of F(), some objects in the 
extent of G(), some objects in neither, and no object is in the extent of both 
F() and G(). For all practical purposes the term satisfied [abbreviated bellow 
as “sat”] means the same as “true in classical logic.”
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Example 1:
F F F F F F F F F F . . G G G G G G G G
sentence alternative negation alternative sat t-rel T/F
~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx & Gx) ~(x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y Y T
~(x)(Fx & Gx) (∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (x)(Fx & Gx) ~(∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y Y T
~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(x)(Fx v Gx) N Y F
~(x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx v Gx) (x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(∃x)(Fx v Gx) Y Y T
Table 2.2.4
Example 2:
F F F F F F F F F F * * G G G G G G G G  
sentence alternative negation alternative sat t-rel T/F
~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx & Gx) ~(x)(~Fx v ~Gx) N Y F
~(x)(Fx & Gx) (∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (x)(Fx & Gx) ~(∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y Y T
~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(x)(Fx v Gx) Y Y T
~(x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx v Gx) (x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(∃x)(Fx v Gx) Y Y T
Table 2.2.5
Example 3:
F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sentence alternative negation alternative sat t-rel T/F
~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx & Gx) ~(x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y N N
~(x)(Fx & Gx) (∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (x)(Fx & Gx) ~(∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y N N
~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(x)(Fx v Gx) N Y F
~(x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx v Gx) (x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(∃x)(Fx v Gx) Y Y T
Table 2.2.6
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Example 4:
* * * * G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
sentence alternative negation alternative sat t-rel T/F
~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx & Gx) ~(x)(~Fx v ~Gx) N Y F
~(x)(Fx & Gx) (∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) (x)(Fx & Gx) ~(∃x)(~Fx v ~Gx) Y Y T
~(∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (x)(Fx v Gx) (∃x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(x)(Fx v Gx) Y N N
~(x)(~Fx & ~Gx) (∃x)(Fx v Gx) (x)(~Fx & ~Gx) ~(∃x)(Fx v Gx) Y N N
Table 2.2.7
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3 Predicate Logic with Two or More Variables
3.1 Introduction
Consider the case of two universal quantifiers. We intend to say that(x)(y)Bxy (3.1.1)
is true iff for all ai in the range of x(y)Baiy
is true. In classical logic that is all there is to it. In the logic of 
presuppositions now there are three additional issues.
1. It could be that some of the (y)Baiy are neither true nor false. We will 
therefore stipulate that we are quantifying only over such (y)Baiy that are t-
relevant, i.e. true or false. 
2. In classical logic 'all' means all of zero, one or more. In the logic of 
presuppositions 'all' means all of one or more. That is we require that at 
least one formula (y)Baiy be t-relevant. 
3. It could be the case that while there is at least one t-relevant (y)Baiy, 
there is no t-relevant (x)Bxbi. This situation is depicted on Figure 2. There is 
no t-relevant formula (x)(Fxb → ~Gxb). The commutativity of the quantifiers
requires that there be at least one t-relevant (x)Bxbi.  (Figure 1)
Below we will attempt to generalize and formalize these notions, as well as 
provide some examples to illustrate how the entire system operates.
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3.2 Definitions
Definition 3.2.1 (t-relevance of quantified sentences):
A sentence (Qx1)(Qx2)...(Qxn)Ax1x2...xn with n variables in prenex normal 
form in a domain |U| is t-relevant iff there is an n-tuple <c1, ..., cn> such 
that(Qx1)Ax1c2...cn is t-relevant [per definition 2.2.2], and (Qx2)Ac1x2...cn is t-relevant and 
...(Qxn)Ac1c2...xn is t-relevant.
There can be multiple n-tuples <c1, ..., cn> that satisfy definition 3.2.1. We 
will call them t-relevant n-tuples. The set of such n-tuples τ is a subset of the
n-dimensional Cartesian product of said domain |U|. In the example of 
Figure 1 they are highlighted in green. Their “projection” in i-th “dimension”
picks a subset of elements for each variable xi. In figure 1 it is the subset 
{a,c} for the variable x and the subset {b,d} for the variable y. Thus each 
variable xi has its own t-relevant subset Xi. We will quantify only over the t-
relevant subsets.  
Consider the example (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) on Figure 1. It is equivalent to 
~(∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy). Its negation is (∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy). This requires only 
one pair <a,b> such that (∃y)(Fay & Gay) and (∃x)(Fxb & Gxb) are satisfied 
and t-relevant. But the criteria of t-relevance ought to be the same for both a
sentence and its negation. Therefore the sentence (y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) ought to 
be considered t-relevant if there is at least one pair <a,b> such that both (y)
(Fay → ~Gay) and (x)(Fxb → ~Gxb) are t-relevant. This justifies definition 
3.2.1.   
Note further (Fig 1) that we quantify only over the t-relevant subset X, 
highlighted in yelow, and the t-relevant subset Y highlighted in blue.
The following definitions are taken almost verbatim from Gerald Massey. 
(1970, pp. 240-242)
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Definition 3.2.2 By interpretation of a wff A, we shall understand a 
nonempty UD together with value assignments to at least all the free 
variables of A.
Definition 3.2.3 An interpretation that assigns values to only the free 
variables of A will be said to be a minimal interpretation of A.
Definition 3.2.4 Let  Σ* be the minimal interpretation of A that results from
an interpretation Σ of A by the omission of any value assignments to 
variables not free in A. We shall speak of Σ* as the minimal interpretation of 
A determined by the interpretation Σ of A.   
Definition 3.2.5 Let Σ be a minimal interpretation of a wff A and τ the set 
of t-relevant n-tuples. Then
(i) If A is an atomic wff φa1...an, the value of A under Σ is truth if <α1,…,αn> is a member of Δ and a member of τ, where Δ is the extension that Σ 
assigns to the predicate variable φ and  α1,…,αn are the individuals that Σ  
assigns to the individual variables a1, …, an; otherwise if <α1,…,αn> ∉ Δ 
but <α1,…,αn> ∈ τ the value of A is falsehood. (No luck if <α1,…,αn> ∉ τ.)
(ii) If A is ~B, the value A under Σ is the opposite to the value of B under Σ.
(iii) If A is B & C, the value of A under Σ is truth if B and C come out true 
under Σ1 and Σ2 respectively, where Σ1 is the minimal interpretation of B 
determined by Σ and  Σ2 is the minimal interpretation of C determined by Σ.
(iv)-(vi) The clauses for ‘v’, ‘→’, and ‘↔’ are analogous to clause (iii).
(vii) If A is (∃b)B, the value of A under Σ is truth if B comes out true under
at least one minimal interpretation of B that determines Σ.
(viii) If A is (b)B, the value of A under Σ is truth if B comes out true under 
every minimal interpretation of B that determines Σ.
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3.3 Examples
Example 1:  (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy)  ==  ~(∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) 
y N N N N N N N N T T N N N N N N N N N
|
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . N
   d | . . . F F F F F . . . G G G G G G . . . T
   b | . . . F F F F . . . G G G G G G G . . . T
| . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
------------------------------------------------x
                  a c
Figure 1
<θ1,θ2> is determined by <a,θ2> is determined by <a,b><θ1,θ2> is determined by <a,θ2> is determined by <a,d><θ1,θ2> is determined by <c,θ2> is determined by <c,b><θ1,θ2> is determined by <c,θ2> is determined by <c,d>
Needles to say by θi we mean that the interpretation does not assign any individual to the variable xi.
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Perhaps the above will become clearer in a tree format:
                      <a,b> 
           <a,θ2>  <
        /             <a,d>
<θ1,θ2>
        \             <c,b>
           <c,θ2>  < 
                      <c,d>
The value of (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) is true if (y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) comes out true under every minimal interpretation of (y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) that determines Σ.
Every minimal interpretation of (y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) that determines Σ is: Σ1 =<a,θ2>, Σ2 = <c,θ2>.  Sentence (y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) has to be true under both of these interpretations in order for (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) to be true. That is, both (y)(Fay → ~Gay) and (y)(Fcy → ~Gcy) have to be true.
But the value of (y)(Fay → ~Gay) is true if (Fay → ~Gay) comes out true under every minimal interpretation of (Fay → ~Gay) that determines Σ1.
Every minimal interpretation of (Fay → ~Gay) that determines Σ1 is: <a,b>, <a,d>.  Sentence (Fay → ~Gay) has to be true under both of these interpretations in order for (y)(Fay → ~Gay) to be true. That is both (Fab → ~Gab) and (Fad → ~Gad) have to be true.  
Analogically for (y)(Fcy → ~Gcy) both (Fcb → ~Gcb) and (Fcd → ~Gcd) have to be true.
A glance at Figure 1 convinces us that all the conditions are satisfied and hence (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) is true.
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Example 2: (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy)  ==  ~(∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy)
y
|
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . .
   b | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
| . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G . . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . G G G G G . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
----------------------------------------------- x
                    a
Figure 2
According to the scenario on Figure 2 the sentence (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) is not t-relevant and hence not true. It would be true in classical logic but not in t-relevant logic.
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Example 3:  (∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy)
y
|
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . .
     | . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . .
   d | . . . F F F F F . * G G G G G G G . . .
   b | . . . F F F F F . . G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-------------------------------------------------x
                  a c
Figure 3
Here an asterisk '*' means F & G.  
<θ1,θ2> is determined by <a,θ2> is determined by <a,b>
<θ1,θ2> is determined by <a,θ2> is determined by <a,d>
<θ1,θ2> is determined by <c,θ2> is determined by <c,b>
<θ1,θ2> is determined by <c,θ2> is determined by <c,d>
Again, here is the tree format:
                      <a,b> 
           <a,θ2>  <
        /             <a,d>
<θ1,θ2>
        \             <c,b>
           <c,θ2>  < 
                      <c,d>
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The value of (∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) is true if (∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) comes out true under at 
least one minimal interpretation of (∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) that determines Σ.
Every minimal interpretation of (∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) that determines Σ is: <a,θ2>, 
<c,θ2>.  Sentence (∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) has to be true under at least one of these 
interpretations in order for (∃x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy) to be true. That is either (∃y)(Fay & 
Gay) or (∃y)(Fcy & Gcy) have to be true.
Consider (∃y)(Fcy & Gcy). It is true if (Fcy & Gcy) comes out true under at least one
minimal interpretation of (Fcy & Gcy) that determines Σ. The minimal 
interpretations that determine <c,θ2> are <c,b>, <c,d>. That is either (Fcb & Gcb)
or (Fcd & Gcd) has to be true. And indeed, the latter is true according to Figure 3!
The negation of this sentence, namely (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) is false.
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Example 4: (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy)
y
|
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . G G G . . . . . . . . . 
| . . . . . . . . G G G . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . G . G . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . G . . . . . . . . .
   b | . . . . . . . . . . G . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . F F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . F F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . F F . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-------------------------------------------------x
                    a
Figure 4
Should we require (∃x)(Fxb → ~Gxb) to be t-relevant? It may seem at first 
that we need not to. We are simply asserting the existence of an x such as a, 
while expecting (y)(Fay → ~Gay) to be true (and hence t-relevant.) We are 
not concerned with the instances of y. So perhaps the t-relevance 
requirement should not apply to the former but only to the latter. That is,  
maybe we should “peel off” the quantifiers only from the left one by one. But 
in fact the substitution of a constant for y is perfectly legitimate. Consider for
example “there is a number smaller or equal than any number”, (Ex)(y)(x ≤y). It seems entirely in order to instantiate y as, say 7 : (Ex)(x ≤ 7), “there 
is a number smaller or equal than 7.” This sentence ought to be t-relevant. 
Another way to see that this needs to be the case is that in t-relavant logic (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) ought to imply (∃x)(∃y)(Fxy → ~Gxy). In this case 
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it is clear that (∃x)(Fxb → ~Gxb) needs to be t-relevant. So given (Ex)(y)Axy we will require the instances (Ex)Axβ of y to be t-relevant.  And that 
is not the case with the scenario on Figure 4. Therefore given this 
interpretation, the sentence (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) is not t-relevant, and 
hence not true.
In classical logic (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) ⊢ (y)(∃x)(Fxy → ~Gxy). But it is 
apparent that we cannot read Fig. 4 as the latter. If we substitute b for y we 
obtain (∃x)(Fxb → ~Gxb). This formula is not t-relevant. It would be a 
disadvantage if the above rule were not preserved in t-relevant logic.
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Example 5: (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy)
y N N N N N N N N T T N N N N N N N N N
|
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . F F F F F F F . . . . . . . . . . . N
   d | . . . F F F F F . * . G G G G G G . . . T
   b | . . . F F F F . . * G G G G G G G . . . T
| . . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . G G G G G G G G G . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N
------------------------------------------------x
                  a c
Figure 5
We are doing a lot better here. We can say (∃x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy) although 
we cannot say (x)(y)(Fxy → ~Gxy). Nor can we say (∃y)(x)(Fxy → ~Gxy).
But in the scenario above also  a perfect example of (y)(∃x)(Fxy → ~Gxy). 
So certainly (∃x)(Fxb → ~Gxb) needs to be t-relevant.
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